Recently, the second author, Briseid and Safarik introduced nonstandard Dialectica, a functional interpretation that is capable of eliminating instances of familiar principles of nonstandard arithmetic -including overspill, underspill, and generalisations to higher types -from proofs. We show that, under few metatheoretical assumptions, the properties of this interpretation are mirrored by first order logic in a constructive sheaf model of nonstandard arithmetic due to Moerdijk, later developed by Palmgren. In doing so, we also draw some new connections between nonstandard principles, and principles that are rejected by strict constructivism.
Introduction
The focus of this paper stands at a confluence of two quite different paths in mathematical logic.
On one end, there is nonstandard arithmetic, and analysis: a subject that has been an upshot of classical model theory, and even after it was recognised that it was amenable to a syntactic treatment, as in Nelson's internal set theory [19] , it mostly remained within the boundaries of classical set theory. On the other end, there is the markedly proof-theoretic topic of functional interpretations, stemming from Gödel's Dialectica interpretation [8] ; and, in particular, its recent revival through the programme of proof mining [13] .
Where these ends meet, is in a general inclination towards the constructivisation of mathematics. The first explicit model of nonstandard analysis, due to Schmieden and Laugwitz [28] , was actually fully constructive, but had a quite weak transfer property. On the other hand, Robinson's model of nonstandard arithmetic [27] , and subsequent ones which were elementary extensions of the standard model, were built from nonconstructive objects, such as nonprincipal ultrafilters of sets. Even in the syntactic approach, it was soon realised that many useful principles led to instances of the excluded middle -the nemesis of intuitionistic mathematics. But did nonstandard analysis really have nothing to offer to constructive analysts?
Not everyone was convinced, including, notably, Per Martin-Löf, who pushed the question in the early 1990s: first, Erik Palmgren succeeded in building a model with a restricted, yet useful transfer principle [22] ; then, in 1995, Ieke Moerdijk described the first constructive model of nonstandard arithmetic with a full transfer principle -a topos of sheaves over a category of filters [18] . Later, by working in this topos, Palmgren provided simplified, nonstandard proofs of several theorems of constructive analysis, and so demonstrated the usefulness of this model [23, 24, 25, 26] .
But if nonstandard proofs do provide some constructive information, we might as well try to extract it in an automated fashion. In 2012, the second author, Briseid and Safarik succeeded in defining a functional interpretation, nonstandard Dialectica [3] , which could eliminate nonstandard principles from proofs of intuitionistic arithmetic in all finite types, enriched,à la Nelson, with a predicate st σ (x), "x is standard", for all types σ; also yielding a proof of conservativity of these principles over the base system. Section 2 is a review. Now, some of the principles validated by nonstandard Dialectica were known to hold in Moerdijk's topos -including a form of Nelson's idealisation axiom, an underspill principle, and the undecidability of the standardness predicate. Our first aim was to investigate how deep this connection would go.
And a deep connection it is: with the exception of one principle, which requires an assumption about the metatheory, all the characteristic principles of nonstandard Dialectica are true in the topos model, for free. Section 3 is devoted to showing this. During this investigation, we also chanced upon two new principles, sequence overspill and sequence underspill, which appear to be more natural equivalents of principles that have been taken into consideration, earlier, in the context of proof-theoretic nonstandard arithmetic. We map their relation to other familiar principles from nonstandard and constructive analysis in Section 2.
Several characteristic principles of nonstandard Dialectica have a peculiarity: they are herbrandised. This is explained in more detail in Section 4; in short, where "traditional" functional interpretations would produce a single witness of an existential statement, these principles produce a finite sequence of potential witnesses, of which at least one is an actual witness. This property destroys the computational meaning of intuitionistic disjunction, yet seems unavoidable in the interpretation of nonstandard arithmetic.
The categorical analysis of nonstandard Dialectica supplied a very convenient way of "deherbrandising", through a simple change in the Grothendieck topology, down from finite covers to singleton covers. Full transfer is lost -in the new topos, disjunction is stronger than in the metatheory -as well as the link to nonstandard arithmetic; but the de-herbrandised principles induce a new functional interpretation, which we call uniform Diller-Nahm, and is the main focus of Section 4.
Uniform Diller-Nahm can be seen as an extension of the Diller-Nahm variant of the Dialectica interpretation [7] , and has some striking similarities to light Dialectica [9] , a variant of Dialectica with two different kinds of quantifiers -computational, and non computational -introduced in 2005 by Mircea-Dan Hernest, for the purpose of more efficient program extraction from formal proofs. Yet, irrespective of its technical value, the characteristic proof system of uniform Diller-Nahm might have a dignity of its own.
In 1985, Vladimir Lifschitz proposed a simple extension of Heyting arithmetic, where a distinction could be made between calculable, and non calculable natural numbers [15] ; a synthesis of classical and intuitionistic arithmetic. Under the interpretation of the predicate st(x) as "x is calculable", the proof system of uniform Diller-Nahm seems to be well-suited for Lifschitz's intended calculus.
Finally, in Section 5, we survey some open questions.
The nonstandard Dialectica interpretation
We start by briefly recalling the definition of the system E-HA ω * st , as introduced in [3] ; we refer to the original paper for a detailed presentation.
The system E-HA ω * st
We take E-HA ω * to be an extension of the system called E-HA ω 0 in [29] , with additional types and constants for handling finite sequences. More precisely, the collection of types T * is generated by the inductive clauses sequences seem to be quite ubiquitous in arguments of nonstandard arithmetic, mostly due to the expanded notion of "finiteness" in a nonstandard model; so it seems preferable to have them built into our syntax.
Since every type is provably inhabited, we can conservatively add for every type σ a constant ∅ σ . Using the list recursor, one can define all the basic operations on finite sequences one needs in practice.
(i) A length function | · | : σ * → 0, satisfying
As expected, concatenation is provably associative, so we will iterate it without bothering with brackets.
The following, easy properties are all established in [3] .
Proof. Let s : σ * . By the sequence axiom SA, either s = σ or s = Cxt for some x : σ, t : σ * . If |s| = 0, the latter case leads to a contradiction, for |s| = S|t| > 0. If |s| = Sn, then the former case leads to a contradiction, and we have proven the directions left to right. The converses are immediate.
Proposition 2.2. E-HA
ω * proves the induction schema for sequences
Definition 2.3. Let s, t : σ * . We say that s and t are extensionally equal, and write s = e t, if
Corollary 2.4. E-HA ω * ∀s, t : σ * (s = e t → s = t) .
Proof. By induction for sequences. Suppose s = e t. If s = σ , then |s| = |t| = 0, so, by Lemma 2.1, t = σ . Otherwise, s = Cxs for some x, s . Then |s| = |t| = Sn for n = |s |; again, by Lemma 2.1, t = Cyt for some y, t . But x = s 0 = t 0 = y, and s = e t ; by the inductive hypothesis, s = t . Therefore, s = Cxs = Cyt = t.
Since finite sequences will be used as a replacement for finite sets, we will borrow some settheoretic notation.
Definition 2.5. Let a : σ, s, s : σ * . We define the abbreviations
We will drop subscripts in most occasions. We also extend the relation ⊆ σ to sequence-valued functionals, pointwise: for s , s :
The relation ⊆ determines a preorder, provably in E-HA ω * .
In the definition of the nonstandard Dialectica translation, one needs a form of application for finite sequences -and an associated form of λ-abstraction -that is monotone in the first component, with respect to the preorder we just defined.
Definition 2.6 (Finite sequence application and abstraction). Let
Notation. We write σ := σ 1 , . . . , σ n , x : σ := x 0 : σ 0 , . . . , x n : σ n for tuples of types and terms. [ ] stands for the empty tuple. We write
with the appropriate types; while, if f := f 0 , . . . , f m , f x stands for f 0 x, . . . , f m x. We will have, correspondingly, λx.f := λx.f 0 , . . . λx.f m , and the same for finite sequence application.
Relations distribute as expected: for instance, if y := y 0 , . . . , y n , with the same length and types as x,
and if s := s 0 : σ * 0 , . . . , s n : σ * n is a tuple of sequences,
Most of the results we have listed so far are easily extended to tuples of terms; in particular, those concerning finite sequence application and abstraction.
We now lay the syntactic groundwork for doing nonstandard arithmetic in our system. Definition 2.9. The system E-HA ω * st is an extension of E-HA ω * , whose language includes a (unary) predicate st σ (x), x : σ, for all types σ of T * ; and the external quantifiers ∀ st x : σ, ∃ st x : σ.
Notation. Following Nelson, so-called internal formulae -those in the language of E-HA ω * -are always denoted with small Greek letters, and generic, external formulae with capital Greek letters.
The following axioms are added to those of E-HA ω * :
1. the defining axioms of the external quantifiers:
2. axioms for the standardness predicate:
3. the external induction schema:
Since it is part of E-HA ω * , the system E-HA ω * st also contains, besides the external induction schema, an "internal" induction schema IA, which is assumed to hold for internal formulae only.
So far, there is nothing inherently nonstandard about the system we have defined. In fact, one could interpret st σ (x) as x = σ x, and all the new axioms would be provable in E-HA ω * . This simple fact also implies that E-HA ω * st is a conservative extension of E-HA ω * . However, there are some simple results, of the kind we would expect from a "standardness property", that can already be proved. Proposition 2.10. For every formula Φ(x), E-HA
Proof. Easy induction on the logical structure of Φ, utilising the fact that the standardness predicate is extensional.
Proof. Apply external induction to the formula Φ(n) := ∀m : 0 (m ≤ n → st 0 (m)) .
Basically anything one can get from standard sequences is standard.
Proof. Everything follows from the standardness axioms, coupled with the fact that the list recursor is standard.
A simple consequence of the lemma is that the operations of sequence application and abstraction, as defined in the previous section, preserve standardness.
Finally, we prove that finite sequences of standard elements are standard; the converse is already a consequence of Lemma 2.12. 
Proof. From the previous lemma, one obtains that if s = Cxt and s is standard, then x and t are also standard. Then one argues precisely as in Proposition 2.2, applying external instead of ordinary induction.
The linguistic blocks are in place for the definition of the nonstandard Dialectica interpretation. 
The idea is that, in the D st interpretation, realisers should be finite sequences of potential realisers, of which at least one is an actual realiser. Hence, if s is a valid realiser, then any s with s ⊆ s should work as well. That this is the case is guaranteed by the following proposition.
proves that ϕ is upwards closed in s:
Proof. By induction on the logical structure of Φ(a), using Lemma 2.8 in the clauses for → and ∀ st z.
In [3] , the nonstandard Dialectica interpretation was given a characterisation in terms of five principles. We provide here an alternative characterisation, which keeps the following three principles from the former.
1. The herbrandised axiom of choice:
2. The herbrandised independence of premise principle:
3. The principle called non-classical realisation in [3] -which, as we will see in Section 4, could also be called herbrandised nonstandard uniformity:
In addition to these, the former characterisation had idealisation
is clearly a consequence of NCR, and the herbrandised generalised Markov's principle
We will replace them as follows.
Definition 2.19. Let s : σ * . We say that s is a hyperfinite enumeration of the type σ if
We define, for all types σ, a predicate hyper(s), such that
as well as quantifiers ranging over hyperfinite enumerations, with defining axioms
The most basic nonstandard principles are, arguably, overspill and underspill in the type of natural numbers:
These principles are almost invariably used with formulae of the form ∀k < n ϕ(k), stating that a certain property holds up to a number n. From the assumption ∀ st n ∀k < n ϕ(k), which says that ϕ holds up to any standard natural number, OS 0 allows one to derive that ϕ holds up to some nonstandard (infinite) number n.
From n, one can obtain a hyperfinite enumeration s := 0, . . . , n of the natural numbers, so that ∀k < n ϕ(k) ↔ ∀k ∈ s ϕ(k); and, in a way, it is this fact -that n induces a hyperfinite enumeration -that is relevant to the argument, rather than n being nonstandard. This suggests the following generalisation of overspill and underspill to all finite types.
We introduce the principle of sequence overspill
and its dual, sequence underspill
Proof. Assume I, and suppose ∀ st s : σ * ϕ(s). Let t : (σ * ) * be a standard sequence of sequences; then s := t 0 · . . . · t |t|−1 is again standard, so ϕ(s) holds. Furthermore, by construction, for all i < |t|, t i ⊆ s; in other words,
By idealisation, we obtain ∃s :
It remains to prove that
, an easy consequence of Lemma 2.12. Conversely, assume OS * , and suppose ∀ st s : σ * ∃y : τ ∀x ∈ s ϕ(x, y). By sequence overspill, it follows that ∃y : τ ∃ hyp s : σ * ∀x ∈ s ϕ(x, y) ,
This concludes the proof.
Several consequences of I are listed in [24] and in [3] , which, by the previous proposition, are also consequences of OS * . For us, it is particularly relevant that OS * implies an external version of the lesser limited principle of omniscience, a nonconstructive principle well-known in the area of reverse mathematics, see e.g. [10] ; namely,
Proof. Suppose ∀ st x, y : σ (ϕ(x) ∨ ψ(y)). We prove by external sequence induction that
For s = σ , ∀x ∈ s ϕ(x) ∨ ∀x ∈ s ψ(x) is vacuously true. Suppose it is true for some arbitrary, standard s, and pick any standard a : σ. We want to show ∀x ∈ Cas ϕ(x) ∨ ∀x ∈ Cas ψ(x). Suppose ∀x ∈ s ϕ(x) (the case where ∀x ∈ s ψ(x) is true is similar). Since
since Cas is a finite sequence, we can run through all b ∈ Cas and see whether ϕ(a) holds. If so, then ∀x ∈ Cas ϕ(x) holds and we are done; otherwise, we will get that ψ(b) holds for all b ∈ Cas and we again achieve the desired disjunction. Now, applying sequence overspill to (1) gives
which implies LLPO st .
Notice that OS 0 alone would have sufficed to prove the restriction of LLPO st to type 0. Since I is equivalent to OS * , it would make sense if R were equivalent to US * ; yet things are not so simple. In fact, only one implication seems to hold.
which, by sequence underspill, implies ∃ st s : σ * ∀y : τ ∃x ∈ s ϕ(x, y).
What is missing, in order to obtain an equivalence, is precisely the last characteristic principle.
which is intuitionistically equivalent to
An application of sequence underspill leads to the conclusion.
We now complete the characterisation of US * .
By the herbrandised generalised Markov's principle, this is equivalent to
which, by realisation and intuitionistic logic, implies
Take a standard t : (σ * ) * as in (2.2), and pick s := t 0 · . . . · t |t|−1 . By Lemma 2.12, s is standard, and, for all t ∈ t, t ⊆ s; therefore, it holds that ϕ(s). We thus prove
and the sequence overspill principle.
Replacing ψ with a contradiction, e.g. 0 = 0 1, and choosing a negated ϕ(x), we see that HGMP st -hence, US * as well -implies an external version of Markov's principle, another noted principle that is rejected by strict constructivism:
This is another instance of a principle whose nature appears markedly nonstandard, forcing a nonconstructive mode of reasoning.
Theorem 2.25 (Soundness of the nonstandard Dialectica interpretation). Suppose
where ∆ int is a set of internal sentences. Let Φ(a)
Then from the proof we can extract a tuple of closed terms t such that
Proof. This is [3, Theorem 5.5], coupled with the fact that OS * + US * ↔ I + R + HGMP st over E-HA ω * st . We provide explicit realisers for the new principles. The interpretation of OS * is
and we can take S := Λs . s . The interpretation of US * is
, we can take
Corollary 2.26. The system
Proof. Follows from the soundness theorem, noting that internal formulae are D st -interpreted as themselves. Again, we refer to [3] for proofs of other consequences of the soundness and characterisation theorems, including the closure of H under the transfer rules
∀x : σ ϕ(x) ,
In summary, the D st interpretation is characterised by two reasonable nonstandard principles, and three principles which share the attribute herbrandised -something we will later explain in detail. In the next section, we will show that, under the right interpretation of a first order language, these principles are true in Moerdijk's topos of filters.
The filter topos N
For this section, we assume some basic knowledge about Grothendieck topoi, what it means to interpret a first order language in a Heyting category, and forcing semantics; [21, Chapter 4] and [16, Chapter 6] can be used as a reference.
The filter construction
In [5] , Blass introduced a category of filters of sets and "continuous" maps between them; rediscovered by Moerdijk, it was used as the underlying category of a site, whose sheaves provided a model of nonstandard arithmetic.
This category arises from Set as a special case of a general construction -the filter constructionwhose properties and functoriality were studied by Butz in [6] . When applied on arbitrary categories with finite limits, it can be considered as a completion of the subobject posets under arbitrary meets. We will briefly discuss the general construction, following Butz, before specialising to the case of Set.
We start by recalling the definition of filter on a ∧-semilattice, i.e. on a poset with all finite meets.
Definition 3.1. Let S be a ∧-semilattice. A filter on S is an inhabited, upwards closed subset of S that is closed under binary meets.
We say that a filter is proper if it does not coincide with S; otherwise, it is non proper.
Following Palmgren, we would rather work with filter bases, indexed by a set I.
Definition 3.2.
A filter base F I on S is an inhabited set {F i } i∈I of elements of S, such that, for all i, j ∈ I, there exists k ∈ I such that F k ≤ F i ∧ F j . A filter base generates a filter, as follows: A belongs to the filter if and only if there exists i ∈ I such that F i ≤ A.
Notice that a filter base generates a non proper filter if and only if it contains the bottom element.
In every category C with finite limits, the subobject posets are in fact ∧-semilattices; it is therefore possible to speak of filters of subobjects. That is sufficient to perform the filter construction. Definition 3.3. Let C be a finitely complete category. The filter category FC over C is described by the following data.
• Objects are pairs (C, F I ), where C is an object of C, and F I is an I-indexed filter base on Sub(C).
We will usually write F for (C, F I ), when the underlying object and indexing set are not relevant, and just call it a filter. We say that the F i , i ∈ I, are the base objects of the filter.
• Morphisms are "germs of continuous morphisms". A continuous morphism α : (C,
in C, defined on some base object F i , such that for all j ∈ J, there exists i ∈ I such that
We declare two such morphisms α :
; that is, the following pullback square commutes:
We have an embedding of C into FC, where an object C of C is identified with the "simple" filter (C, {C}). We will usually still denote the latter with C.
We will not be overly pedantic about distinguishing between morphisms and their germs, and will write both in the same style. Proof. It is sufficient that FC has a terminal object, binary products and equalisers. We give their construction, and omit the proof of the universal properties.
The terminal object is the filter (1, {1}). The product of (C, F I ) and of (D,
The equaliser of two morphisms α, β : (C,
where C is the equaliser of α and β in C, and (F ∧ C ) i := F i ∧ C for all i ∈ I. Lemma 3.5. A morphism α : F → G of FC, defined on a base object F i , is a monomorphism if and only if there exists a base object F j ≤ F i such that α Fj is a monomorphism in C.
Proof. See [6, Lemma 2.2]. Proposition 3.6. For all filters F in FC, Sub(F) is a meet-complete semilattice, and, for all α : F → G, the change of base functor α * preserves all meets.
Proof. By the previous lemma, if α : (C,
It follows that subobjects of (D, G J ) are in one-to-one correspondence to objects (D, G J ), such that the base G J generates a filter larger than G J .
Given an arbitrary family of subobjects D,
, let H be the filter generated by finite meets of the form G (i1)
for (i 1 , . . . , i n ) an arbitrary finite sequence in I, and
That this is preserved by change of base can be easily verified by the explicit construction of pullbacks in FC.
An important feature of the filter construction is that it preserves some of the additional properties that C may have. Moreover, if C has all finite coproducts, then FC has them too. In this case, the initial object of FC is the simple filter (0, {0}); this is isomorphic to any non proper filter (C, F I ), where F i = 0 for some i ∈ I. Given two filters (C, F I ) and (D, G J ), their coproduct in FC is the filter (C + D,
It is not, however, the case that FC is necessarily a Heyting category, when C is. But this is not a problem, since we really only need FSet to be a coherent category.
As it happens, coherent categories admit a "natural" Grothendieck topology, sometimes called the precanonical topology: for all objects C of C, a K-cover of C is a finite family {f i :
, such that the union of the images of the f i is the whole of C.
As shown in [11, Example C2.1.12.(d)], K is subcanonical ; that is, representable presheaves, of the form yC, for C an object of C, are K-sheaves.
Explicitly, for a filter category FC, that {β k :
is a K-cover means that, for all choices of base objects G k,j k of G k , k = 1, . . . , n, there exists a base object F i of F such that
Definition 3.8. We will denote the topos Sh(FSet, K) by N , for nonstandard universe.
As for all Grothendieck topoi, the global sections functor Γ : N → Set , sending a sheaf F to the set Hom(1, F ), has a left adjoint ∆ : Set → N -the constant objects functor. This can be explicitly characterised as follows: for all sets S, at all filters F of FSet, (∆S)F = {α : F → S | α takes a finite number of values} .
Here, S is identified with the simple filter (S, {S}). It follows that the Yoneda embedding preserves all coproducts of a finite number of copies of 1, but not the natural numbers object.
Let L be a many sorted first order language, and suppose we have fixed an interpretation of L in Set. We call formulae of L internal, and denote them with small Greek letters. We also want the types of L to be closed under the clause if S is a type, then S * is a type, where S * is meant to denote the type of finite sequences of elements of type S. We will borrow all the notation from the first section in handling finite sequences.
We will identify types, function and relation symbols of L with their interpretation in Set, and use the standard double square bracket notation for the derived interpretations that we are now going to define. We will take advantage of this semantic overload, and say, for instance, that the type S is inhabited, or that it is infinite, if its interpretation in Set is; and also that a formula ϕ is true, if its interpretation is true in Set.
Let L st be the extension of L with a unary predicate symbol st S ⊆ S for each type S. We denote formulae of L st with capital Greek letters. We will use abbreviations
as well as the defined predicate
for s : S * , with the relative quantifiers
We will often drop the subscript, and just write st(x), or hyper(s).
We define an interpretation of L st in N , as follows:
(i) for each type S, S := yS;
(ii) for each constant c : S, c := yc : 1 → yS;
(v) for each type S, st S := ∆S.
In particular, st N is the natural numbers object in N , and the larger sheaf N is a nonstandard model of arithmetic.
The following, fundamental theorem connects the forcing semantics of internal formulae in N with truth in the metatheory. It is found as [24, Theorem 1] , and is an extension of [18, Lemma 2.1].
Theorem 3.9. Let ϕ(x) be an internal formula, with free variable x of type S, and (C, F I ) a filter. For all α ∈ S F, F ϕ(α) if and only if there exists i ∈ I such that, for all u ∈ F i , it holds that ϕ(α(u)).
Corollary 3.10 (Transfer theorem). Let ϕ be an internal sentence. Then ϕ is true if and only if ϕ.
Theorem 3.9 says everything there is to know about internal formulae; we move on to the semantics of the standardness predicate.
Lemma 3.11. Let F be a filter, S a type of L, and α ∈ S F. Then: F st S (α) if and only if there exist a K-cover {β k : G k → F} n k=1 , and elements x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ S, such that the diagrams
Proof. Follows immediately from the interpretation chosen for the standardness predicate, and the description of ∆S.
Lemma 3.12. Let Φ(x, y) be an external formula, with free variables x : S and y : T , F a filter, and α ∈ S F. Then: , and elements y 1 , . . . , y n ∈ T , such that
or, equivalently, there exists t ∈ T * such that F ∃y ∈ t! Φ(α, y);
Proof. See [23, Lemma 3.3] .
With these lemmata, we are able to prove that the simple axioms that we imposed on the standardness predicate in the system E-HA ω * st hold in N . That the predicate respects equality is immediate; that closed terms are standard amounts, in this context, to the fact that, for all types S and elements α ∈ S 1, st S (α) , as any morphism α : 1 → S is obviously constant.
Proposition 3.13. For all types S, T , the following statement is true in N :
Proof. By Lemma 3.12, ∀ st f : S → T ∀ st x : S st T (f (x)) if and only if, for all f ∈ (S → T ), and
But f !(x!) = f (x)! , and the latter is clearly standard.
Proposition 3.14. The external induction schema IA st holds in N .
Proof. Let Φ(x, n) be an external formula, with x : S and n : N, F a filter, and α ∈ S F. Suppose
Then, by Lemma 3.12, we have that F Φ(α, 0!) and that, for all n ∈ N, F Φ(α, n!) implies F Φ(α, Sn!). By induction in the metatheory, we obtain that, for all n ∈ N, F Φ(α, n!) , so, again by the semantics of the external quantifiers, F ∀ st n : N Φ(α, n).
Lemma 3.12 has also the following easy consequence.
Corollary 3.15. Let ϕ be an internal formula. Then ∀ st x : S ∃ st y : T ϕ(x, y) if and only if it is true that ∀x ∈ S ∃y ∈ T ϕ(x, y). Equivalently, the rule
∀x : σ ∃y : τ ϕ(x, y) ∀ st x : σ ∃ st y : τ ϕ(x, y) .
holds in N .
We have, by now, a good picture of the semantics of first order logic in the filter topos N . In the next section, we will deal with the characteristic principles of nonstandard Dialectica.
Characteristic principles
For the results in this section, we cannot take much credit, since a characterisation of first order logic in the topoi Sh(FC, K), with C coherent, has already been provided by Butz [6, Proposition 4.5], albeit with a different aim and formalism. The choice of principles, however, is different, due to our focus on nonstandard arithmetic; moreover, it will allow us to see herbrandisation "in action", once we decide to "de-herbrandise" in the following section.
We start from the truly nonstandard principles, sequence overspill and underspill. Proof. Let ϕ(y, s) be an internal formula, with variables y : T , and s : S * , (C, F I ) an arbitrary filter, α ∈ T F, and assume F ∀ st s : S * ϕ(α, s) .
By Lemma 3.12, for all s ∈ S * , F ϕ(α, s!); by transfer (Theorem 3.9), for all s ∈ S * , there exists i ∈ I such that, for all u ∈ F i , ϕ(α(u), s) .
Define a filter (C × S * , G I×S * ), as follows: for all i ∈ I, t ∈ S * ,
The filter condition is easily checked: given
The projections π 1 : G → F, and π 2 : G → S * are clearly continuous. We now check
By definition, this means G ∀ st x : S (x ∈ π 2 ); equivalently, for all x ∈ S, G x! ∈ π 2 . By transfer, it suffices to prove that, for all x ∈ S, there exists (i, t) ∈ I × S * , such that for all u ∈ F i , and s ⊇ t, it holds that x ∈ s; so we can take t := x , and i ∈ I arbitrary. Furthermore, G ϕ(απ 1 , π 2 ) holds by construction. Hence, in order to derive that
it remains to show that π 1 is covering. Let G (i,t) be an arbitrary base set of G. By the assumption, we can find j ∈ I such that, for all u ∈ F j , ϕ(α(u), t); then, if we choose k ∈ I such that F k ⊆ F i ∩ F j , we have that
Lemma 3.17. Let Φ(x) be an external formula, x : S, such that
Then ∀y :
holds in N for all internal formulae ϕ.
Proof. Let F be any filter, ϕ(y, x) an internal formula, y : T , and α ∈ T F. Suppose F ∀x : S (Φ(x) → ϕ(α, x)); equivalently,
Assume (2). Then, there exist a cover {G k → 1} n k=1 , and elements
By our interpretation of the type S, the σ k correspond to morphisms σ k : G k → S in FSet; by monotonicity of the forcing relation, we obtain
which, by the commutativity of the diagrams
Therefore, from (3), it follows, by monotonicity, that
by transfer, for all k = 1, . . . , n, there exist base sets F i k of F, G k,j k of G k , such that for all u ∈ F i k , and v ∈ G k,j k , it holds that ϕ(α(u), σ k (v)). Now, since the G k cover 1, there exists some x ∈ σ 1 G 1,j1 ∪ . . . ∪ σ n G n,jn . For such an x, taking F i ⊆ F i1 ∩ . . . ∩ F in , and using transfer,
hence F ∃ st x : S ϕ(α, x), which was to be proved.
Proposition 3.18. The principle US * holds in N .
Proof. Follows from the previous lemma, by taking Φ(s) := hyper(s), and using for condition (2) the fact that, by sequence overspill, hyperfinite enumerations of any type exist in N .
Given sequence overspill and underspill, one can adapt the proofs of the first section to show that other principles, including idealisation and the herbrandised generalised Markov's principle, hold in N . However, one should pay attention to the fact that, while finite types were all inhabited, and actually had infinitely many elements, in this context a type S can be finite, or even empty. So, for instance, the implication OS * → OS only holds for types with infinitely many elements: by definition of standardness, a finite set has only standard elements.
Next, we deal with two characteristic principles of nonstandard Dialectica, whose validity in the filter topoi is independent of the metatheory. Proof. Let F be any filter, Φ(z, x, y) an external formula, x : S, y : T, z : U , and α ∈ U F. Assume F ∀y : T ∃ st x : S Φ(α, x, y) , or, equivalently,
By the semantics of the ∃ st quantifier in N , this means that there exists s ∈ S * such that
equivalently, since s! = s!π 1 , F ∀y : T ∃x ∈ s! Φ(α, x, y). Therefore,
The next proof is a variant of one by Butz [6] . It utilises the following, general result about Grothendieck topoi. Here, a is the sheafification functor.
Lemma 3.20. Let (C, J) be a site. A set {f i : C i → C} i∈I of morphisms of C is J-covering if and only if the set {ayf i : ayC i → ayC} i∈I is jointly epimorphic in Sh(C, J).
Proof. See [16, Corollary III.7.7] . Proof. Let F be any filter, ϕ(z, x) an internal formula, Ψ(z, y) an external formula, with x : S, y : T , z : U , and α ∈ U F. Suppose
By the semantics of first order logic in a Heyting category, this is equivalent to
in Sub(yF). By the semantics of the ∀ st predicate, we can write
and, by the suitable transfer theorem, for all x ∈ S,
Since the Yoneda embedding preserves and reflects all limits, we obtain
For the consequence, we have, by the semantics of ∃ st in N , that
where we also used that unions are stable under pullback. Thus, there is a monomorphism m :
Let ı t : F t t∈T * F y be the inclusions of the F t in their union, for all t ∈ T * , and consider the pullback diagrams
Now, we use the fact that each m * F t can be covered with a family of representable sheaves, to obtain a family {f t : yG t → yH} t∈T * of morphisms, such that each mf t factors through a single F t .
Moreover, since the {ı t : F t t∈T * F t } y∈T jointly cover t∈T * F t , and in a Heyting pretopos all epimorphisms are stable under pullback [16, Proposition IV.7.3] , the family {f t : yG t → yH} t∈T * is jointly epimorphic over yH.
By the previous lemma, we can extract from it a family of the form {yβ k : yG k → yH} n k=1 , where
Translating back to forcing semantics, this is precisely the statement that
from which it follows that
So far, we used no principles whose constructive status is controversial, neither in the construction of the model, nor in our proofs. However, for our last pair of characteristic principles to hold, we must require that the axiom of choice holds in the metatheory. Proof. Let F be any filter, Φ(z, x, y) an external formula, x : S, y : T, z : U , and α ∈ U F. Assume
by Lemma 3.12, this means in N that, for all x ∈ S, there exists t ∈ T * such that
With the axiom of choice, we can find a function f ∈ S → T * such that, for all x ∈ S, F ∃y ∈ f (x)! Φ(α, x!, y) .
In fact, a herbrandised version of the axiom of choice would suffice; but that would be a strange axiom to have in one's metatheory. The condition is necessary to a certain extent, for HAC st implies a herbrandised axiom of choice -call it HAC -in Set: suppose ∀x ∈ S ∃y ∈ T ϕ(x, y) .
By Corollary 3.15, it follows that ∀ st x : S ∃ st y : T ϕ(x, y). If HAC st holds in N , we can deduce
and, applying the transfer theorem again, we obtain ∃f ∈ S → T * ∀x ∈ S ∃y ∈ f (x) ϕ(x, y)
in Set.
In the same way, the transfer rules can be used to rule out unconstrained validity of other principles in N , as in the following example.
Example 3.23. Let T (s) be a binary tree, i.e. an internal formula on binary sequences such that 1. T ( ) holds, and
The fan theorem is the statement that for any such T , if, for all sequences s ∈ 2 N , there exists n ∈ N such that ¬ T (sn), then there exists some n ∈ N such that ¬ T (sn) holds for all s ∈ 2 N . We consider the following, external version of the fan theorem:
We claim that, if FAN st holds in N , then the fan theorem holds in the metatheory. For suppose that, for all s ∈ 2 N , there exists n ∈ N such that ¬ T (sn). By transfer,
and, if FAN st holds, we deduce
This means that there exists a finite sequence t of natural numbers, such that
By condition 2 on binary trees, we have that, if ¬ T (sn) and m ≥ n, then also ¬ T (sm); therefore, pickingñ := max{t 0 , . . . , t |t|−1 }, we are sure that
By transfer, for all s ∈ 2 N , ¬ T (sñ), and we have proved the fan theorem.
The uniform Diller-Nahm interpretation
In this section, we take a step back, forgetting about nonstandard arithmetic for a while; a reconsideration of ideas from Lifschitz, Berger, and Hernest leads us to a new functional interpretationuniform Diller-Nahm -of which nonstandard Dialectica can be seen, a posteriori, as a herbrandised version.
Calculability and herbrandisation
In [15] , Lifschitz made the suggestion to see constructive mathematics as an extension of classical mathematics. Lifschitz's proposal is to enrich the language of Heyting arithmetic with a predicate K(n), "n is calculable"; and then extend Kleene's recursive realisability relation, write it x r K ϕ, with the clause
all the while interpreting quantifiers uniformly:
In this definition, quantifiers are, by themselves, completely void of any computational meaning; it is by invoking quantifiers restricted to calculable numbers, ∀n (K(n) → . . .), and ∃n (K(n) ∧ . . .), that one restores it. A couple of decades later, Lifschitz's demand was rediscovered, from a completely different perspective, in the area of proof mining. Rather than the foundational issue of injecting a certain "modular constructiveness" into classical reasoning, it was the practical problem of more efficient program extraction from proofs that was addressed.
Even in fully intuitionistic proofs, a fine-grained analysis reveals instances of formulae with quantifiers that are computationally redundant; i.e. the constructive content that is encoded in the quantifiers is never used in the program extracted with the aid of a functional interpretation. This always happens, in particular, when -in a natural deduction setting -an implication introduction discharges more then one instance of the same formula, so that the contraction rule needs to be used.
One would want a way to flag such quantifiers, telling the extraction program to just "pass through" them. This is the function performed by Berger's uniform quantifiers [4] and by Hernest's quantifiers without computational meaning [9] . But, realisability being a rudimentary functional interpretation -this is clear, in particular, for Kreisel's modified brand, see [20] -this is also what Lifschitz's calculability predicate achieved! One possibly unexpected consequence of Lifschitz's ideas is that there will be two types disjunction as well. One is a computationally empty disjunction ∨, with
while there is also a computationally relevant disjunction ∨ K , with
These are not equivalent: in fact, only the second computationally relevant disjunction will act as a disjunction with respect to all the formulas in the language; the computationally empty disjunction only acts as a disjunction with respect to "internal'' formulas (i.e., those not containing the Kpredicate).
Herbrandisation can be seen as a way of repairing this schism. The idea is to weaken the computational meaning of the K-predicate and define instead x r K K(n) if and only if x codes a sequence and n is one of the components of the sequence coded by x. This is reminiscent of Herbrand disjunctions in classical logic -whence the name. There are some technical difficulties to overcome and this idea works especially well in the context of modified realizability, leading to Herbrand realizability as introduced in [3] .
This process of herbrandisation is reflected in many of the characteristic principles of Herbrand realizability. While the axiom of choice for finite types
is a characteristic principle of modified realizability, the herbrandised axiom of choice
(writing st again instead of K) is a characteristic principle of Herbrand realizability. It seems natural to regard many of the characteristic principles of nonstandard Dialectica as herbrandisations of other, unherbrandised, principles, suggesting that also nonstandard Dialectica can be obtained by a process of herbrandisation from a functional interpretation which incorporates many of Lifschitz's ideas. The aim of this section is to show that this is indeed the case.
Remark 4.1. Note that it is an immediate consequence of herbrandisation that disjunction loses any constructive meaning. In fact, a good way to think about herbrandisation is as a way of weakening the computational meaning of the K-predicate in such a way that ∨ K collapses to the ordinary, computationally empty, disjunction. Something like this is presumably unavoidable when one wants to interpret nonstandard systems: indeed, there seems to be a clash between the computational meaning of disjunction and nonstandard arithmetic. One way in which this manifests itself is that systems for nonstandard arithmetic often do not have the disjunction property: for example, E-HA ω * st + OS 0 does not have the disjunction property, as proved in [1] . Another manifestation is the incompatibility of Church's Thesis for disjunctions
with the existence of nonstandard models for arithmetic (see [17] ), showing, for instance, that there are no nonstandard models of arithmetic in the effective topos. This should be compared with the Herbrand topos from [2] , where nonstandard models of arithmetic do exist.
Before defining our new functional interpretation, we should first "de-herbrandise" our system. By the previous discussion, we can already guess that "internal formula" has to be replaced by the next best thing -"internal and ∨-free formula".
Notation. If P is an axiom schema where certain schematic variables range over internal formulae of E-HA ω * st , we write P ∨ for the same axiom schema, where "internal" is replaced by "internal and ∨-free". 
Since the restriction to ∨-free formulae also applies to the internal induction schema IA, we do not get a proper system of arithmetic. This would actually be inconsistent with the nonstandard uniformity principle NU. Proof. Suppose ∀n : 0 (n = 0 ∨ ¬ n = 0). This is equivalent to
which, by nonstandard uniformity, implies
the statement that all natural numbers are zero, or all are non-zero; a contradiction.
With the interpretation of st(n) as "n is calculable", this is not unexpected; for how could we know whether a non-calculable number is zero or non zero? Notice that ∀ st n : 0 (n = 0 ∨ ¬ n = 0) is still provable, thanks to the external induction schema.
The reason why we called NU a uniformity principle is the similarity of
to Troelstra's uniformity principle [30, Proposition 8.21 ]
a second-order principle that is validated by higher-order versions of recursive realisability, and which also has nonclassical consequences.
We can now define our de-herbrandised functional interpretation, prove that it is sound, and characterised by the desired proof system.
The first thing to notice is that, if this interpretation is restricted to formulae that contain only external quantifiers -or, if you prefer, everything is declared standard -it is the same as the usual Diller-Nahm translation. In fact, except for a minor change in the interpretation of the uniform existential quantifier, it is to the Diller-Nahm variant precisely what Hernest's light Dialectica interpretation is to Dialectica.
Secondly, the interpretation is idempotent: formulae of the form
with ϕ internal and ∨-free are interpreted as themselves, as shown by an easy induction on their structure. This is a feature that the D st -translation lacked, due to the clause for the ∃ st quantifier. We will now prove soundness of the interpretation. We will not handle everything explicitly, though: except those concerning the quantifiers, all the logical axioms and rules admit the same realisers as those for the Diller-Nahm interpretation.
We write E-HA ω * ∨ for the system E-HA ω * with IA ∨ in place of IA.
Theorem 4.4 (Soundness of uniform Diller-Nahm). Suppose
where ∆ ∨ is a set of internal, ∨-free sentences. Let Φ(a)
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of the derivation.
1. The logical axioms and rules of intuitionistic first order predicate logic. We consider the quantifier axioms and rules, and give another couple of examples, referring again to [29, 3.5.4] for the rest.
and we can take Z := λx.0 , X := λx.x , U arbitrary, S := λx, y , v. y .
∀y ∈ Sxy ∀z ϕ(x, y, z, a) → ϕ(X x, y , b, a) , so we can take X := λx.x , S := λx, y . y .
∀y ∈ Sxt ϕ(x, y, b, a) → ∃z ∀y ∈ t ϕ(X x, y , z, a) , and we can take X := λx.x , S := λx, t.t .
(iv) Example -modus ponens.
, and that we have terms t 1 realising the interpretation of A U and T 2 , T 3 realising the interpretation of (A → B) U .
This means we have E-HA ω * ∨ + ∆ ∨ ∀y ϕ(t 1 , y, a) , and E-HA
, where z is not free in ψ, and that we have terms
Suppose that
We have
∀s ∈ Sxv ∃z ∀y ∈ s ϕ(x, y, z, a) → ψ(U x, v, b) ; so we can take T 3 := T 1 , and T 4 := λx, v. T 2 xv , to obtain E-HA ω * ∨ + ∆ ∨ ∀x, v ∀s ∈ T 4 xv ∃z ∀y ∈ s ϕ(x, y, z, a) → ψ(T 3 x, v, b) .
2.
The nonlogical axioms of extensional Heyting arithmetic in all finite types (with the restricted induction schema IA ∨ ). These are all internal and ∨-free, hence are realised by the empty tuple.
3. The defining axioms of the external quantifiers. Let Φ(x)
The interpretation of this axiom is
so we can take Y := λf , x .f x .
5. The external induction schema.
As in [3] , we consider the equivalent external induction rule
from which the external induction schema is obtained by taking Φ(m) :
So, suppose that (Φ(n)) U = ∃ st x ∀ st y ϕ(x, y, n, a), and that we have realisers t 1 , and T 2 , T 3 for the premises; i.e. E-HA ω * ∨ + ∆ ∨ ∀y ϕ(t 1 , y, 0, a) , and E-HA ω * ∨ + ∆ ∨ ∀n, x, y (∀y ∈ T 3 nxy ϕ(x, y, n, a) → ϕ(T 2 nx, y , n + 1, a)) .
By taking T 4 := λn.Rt 1 T 2 n, we obtain, by induction for ∨-free formulae in E-HA ω *
∨ , that E-HA ω * ∨ + ∆ ∨ ∀n, y ϕ(T 4 n, y, n, a) , which was to be proved.
The principles OS
, with ϕ internal and ∨-free.
This is interpreted as
and we can take S := λs . s .
(
The interpretation of this axiom schema is
so we can take S := λs .s .
For the principles NU, AC st , IP st ∀ ∨ , we can just observe that the premise and the conclusion have identical interpretations, so it is trivial to find realisers for the implication. We do the first as an example. Proof. We prove (a) by induction on the logical structure of Φ. For Φ ≡ ϕ internal atomic, obviously H ϕ ↔ ϕ U . Let Φ ≡ st(x). If x is standard, it follows that ∃ st y (x = y), by taking y := x. Conversely, if ∃ st y (x = y), by the first axiom for the standardness predicate it follows that x is standard. Hence,
For the induction hypothesis, using an appropriate embedding of tuples of types into higher types, and a compatible coding of tuples of terms [29, 1.6 .17], we can assume, given formulae Φ and Ψ, that there exist internal, ∨-free formulae ϕ, ψ such that
(i) For ∧, by intuitionistic logic,
(ii) For ∨,
is equivalent in H to
By IP st ∀ ∨ , this is equivalent to
and we are back to the case of conjunction.
(iii) For →, we proceed as with Diller-Nahm implication. By intuitionistic logic and the principle IP
Now, adapting Proposition 2.23, we see that E-HA
Two applications of AC st then lead to is equivalent to ∃ st x ∀ st s ∃z ∀y ∈ s ϕ(x, y, z) .
(v) For ∀z, we use that by NU ∀z ∃ st x ∀ st y ϕ(x, y, z)
is equivalent to ∃ st x ∀ st y ∀z ϕ(x, y, z) .
(vi) For ∃ st z, nothing really needs to be done.
(vii) For ∀ st z, we just use AC st once in order to obtain that
is equivalent to ∃ st X ∀ st y, z ϕ(Xz, y, z) .
This proves item (a). For (b), suppose Φ satisfies the condition, and that Φ U = ∃ st x ∀ st y ϕ(x, y). Then, from H + Φ Φ it follows that there exist closed terms t such that E-HA ω * ∨ ∀y ϕ(t, y) . We now show how the uniform Diller-Nahm interpretation may be used to extract programs from proofs, and eliminate instances of its characteristic principles. Finally, we derive a few properties of the system H, which follow from the properties of the uniform Diller-Nahm interpretation. We can now provide a characterisation of N as a subtopos of U.
Proposition 4.13. Let j be the smallest local operator on U such that m : 2 y2 is j-dense. Then sh j (U) N .
Proof. First observe that it the relevant definitions imply that the K-covering families are precisely those finite families {G k → F } n k=1 such that G 1 + G 2 + . . . + G k → F is K 1 -covering. From this description, it follows that K is the smallest topology extending K 1 for which also families consisting of two sum inclusions {F 1 → F 1 + F 2 , F 2 → F 1 + F 2 } are covering.
So to prove the proposition, it suffices to show that for any local operator for which m : 2 y2 is j-dense, we must have that families consisting of two sums inclusions {F 1 → F 1 +F 2 , F 2 → F 1 +F 2 } are j-covering. To show this, consider the pullback square:
where the map on the bottom of the square is obtained by applying the Yoneda embedding to the coproduct of the maps F 1 → 1 and F 2 → 1. So if m is j-dense, then so must be the map on the left of the square. But then it follows from Lemma 3.20 that
Let L st be a first order language enriched with a standardness predicate, as in Section 3; we interpret L st in U just as we did in N , except that we take (v') for each type S, st S := ∆ 1 S, so that st N is again the natural numbers object.
As we foretold, "internal" becomes "internal and ∨-free" in this larger topos. Let 1 be the forcing relation in U.
Theorem 4.14. Let ϕ(x) be an internal, ∨-free formula, with free variable x of type S, and (C, F I ) a filter. For all α ∈ S F, F 1 ϕ(α) if and only if there exists i ∈ I such that, for all u ∈ F i , it holds that ϕ(α(u)). The standardness predicate, and consequently the existential quantifier, are de-herbrandised, as we wished. Proof. Easy variation on the proof of Lemma 3.12.
"operational" interpretation: a nonstandard number is badly incalculable -so badly, that it cannot even be narrowed down to a finite selection of candidates. We conclude with a review of new questions that our results raise. Then, we defined a new functional interpretation, but ignore, so far, how useful it is for applications. Its similarity to light Dialectica is encouraging; on the other hand, the use of functional interpretations has been most successful in program extraction from classical proofs, and we have not investigated yet how well uniform Diller-Nahm composes with negative translations, such as Kuroda's [14] .
In light of the results of Chapter 3, Palmgren's work on the topos N indicates that the characteristic principles of nonstandard Dialectica lead to a useful calculus for nonstandard analysis. We conjectured that the characteristic principles of uniform Diller-Nahm may be a good axiomatisation of Lifschitz's calculability arithmetic [15] ; is this correct, and could this also be a useful calculus by itself?
On a more speculative note, Oliva provided in [20] a unified view of the Dialectica, Diller-Nahm, and modified realisability interpretations, through linear logic. Is there an equivalent of herbrandisation in linear logic -connected, perhaps, to the bang (!) modaliser -such that nonstandard Dialectica and Herbrand realisability, too, would be amenable to such a treatment?
We hope that these, and related questions can be answered in future work.
